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Abstract 
When the Second Balkan War broke out in 1913, the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of 
Bulgaria broke off diplomatic relations. Owing to the conflicting military and political interests, the 
former allies and partners became blatant enemies. The subject matter of this paper are some issues 
of the Serbian-Bulgarian relations after the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913, and especially after 
reestablishing diplomatic relations in January 1914, up to the autumn of 1915. 
Special attention was paid to the attempts of the political leadership in Sofia to destabilize the security 
situation in the newly liberated parts of Serbia through negative propaganda, as well as the standpoint of 
the Kingdom of Bulgaria towards the Austro-German aggression on Serbia during the second half of 
1914.  
The paper also discusses the standpoint of official Sofia towards the Balkan policy of the Central 
Powers at the beginning of World War I, up to Bulgaria’s accession to the block in September 1915. 
Keywords: The Kingdom of Bulgaria; the Kingdom of Serbia; propaganda; newly liberated regions; 
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Аннотация 
С началом Второй балканской войны в 1913 году произошел разрыв дипломатических 
отношений между Королевством Сербии и Королевством Болгарии. Бывшие союзники и 
партнеры вследствие противоположных военных и политических интересов стали открытыми 
врагами. Предметом интереса настоящего исследования являются отдельные вопросы 
сербско-болгарских отношений после Балканских войн 1912-1913 гг., и особенно после 
возобновления дипломатических контактов в январе 1914 г., вплоть до осени 1915 года. 
Особое внимание уделяется попыткам правительства Софии путем пропаганды 
дестабилизировать спокойную обстановку в новоосвобожденных краях Сербии. Авторы 
анализируют отношение Королевства Болгарии к австро-германской агрессии против Сербии 
в течение второй половины 1914 года. Рассматривается также официальная позиция Софии 
по отношению к балканской политике Тройственного союза в начале Первой мировой войны 
вплоть до болгарского присоединения к этому блоку в сентябре 1915 года. 
Ключевые слова: Королевство Болгария; Королевство Сербия; пропаганда; 
новоосвобожденные края; война. 
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Significant victories of the Serbian Army at 
Kumanovo, Bitola, Prilep and Bregalnica enabled 
Serbia to return the territories of Old Serbia and 
Macedonia under its state and legal jurisdiction after 
several centuries of slavery. Apart from its territorial 
expansion, success in the Balkan Wars contributed to 
the strengthening of the international reputation of 
Serbia, solidifying its role of the Balkan Piedmont 
which it had among the Slavic population under 
Austro-Hungarian occupation, and improving its 
position among the Balkan states. On the other hand, 
Bulgaria, which fought against Turkey alongside 
Serbia in the First Balkan War, emerged defeated 
from the Second Balkan War [4, p. 346]. It was left 
injured and deprived of its centuries-old aspiration to 
establish supremacy over Macedonia and Thrace, 
thus ending its “national unification”. The Bucharest 
Peace Agreement disabled further military actions 
towards the aforementioned territories, and 
Bulgaria’s conquest was reduced to the area of Pirin 
Macedonia and a smaller part of Thrace
1
. The 
Bulgarian diplomacy had little space for maneuvers 
in 1913. All that remained was to keep a watchful 
eye on the political developments in Europe and wait 
for the right moment for revenge and rematch.  
The diplomatic relations between Serbia and 
Bulgaria were broken off at the beginning of the 
Second Balkan War and were resumed in January 
1914 with the reopening of the Serbian Legation in 
Sofia
2
. The same month witnessed the first visit of 
the Serbian chargé d’affaires to the President of the 
Bulgarian Government. Serbia’s tendency was to 
normalize the relations with its neighbor while the 
government circles in Bulgaria still felt indignation 
and reservation. This kind of attitude of the Bulgarian 
government was enticed by a growing influence of 
the Dual Monarchy in Sofia
3
. Apart from diplomacy, 
the cooling relations between the two states in 1914 
could be seen in other fields as well. The ruling 
political circles in Sofia did not try to conceal their 
open hatred towards Serbia. The Sofia press was at 
the forefront of efforts to promote intolerance, 
especially the editions titled Dnevnik, Utro and 
Vecherna Poshta. Resenting the defeat and losses 
1
 Balkanski ugovorni odnosi 1876–1996 [The Contractual 
Relations in the Balkans 1876–1996], I, 1876–1918, 
editor: M. Stojković, Belgrade 1998, doc. No. 87, p. 179. 
2
Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–
1914 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia 1903–1914], vol. VII, nb. 1, January 1/14 – 
April 30/May 13, 1914, editors: V. Dedijer, Ž. Anić, 
Belgrade, 1980, doc. No. 32, p. 151. 
3
Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–
1914 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia 1903–1914], vol. VII, nb. 1, January 1/14 – 
April 30/May 13, 1914, doc. No. 41, p. 159. 
they suffered in the war, they showered the public 
with fabricated events, machinations and intrigues in 
order to create a negative image of the Serbs in 
Europe and cause unrest in Old Serbia and 
Macedonia. The pages of the cited Bulgarian 
newspapers were often full of news about the 
“atrocities of the Serbian soldiers and government”. 
In May 1914, they published a piece of news 
regarding the massacre of recruits from the newly 
liberated regions of the Kingdom of Serbia. The 
Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed of 
this by its representative in Bulgaria, Čolak-Antić. 
His telegram to Belgrade stated that the Bulgarian 
press was spreading the news that whole companies 
of recruits from Macedonia were slaughtered in 
Ristovac
4, Niš, and Kragujevac, which was followed 
by pretentious commentaries of these events. This 
kind of reporting was designed to jeopardize the 
reputation of the Serbian Army and compromise it. 
Right after the aforementioned newspaper 
accusations were published, the official Serbian 
institutions denied these claims by pointing out that 
no military units were stationed in Ristovac, while 
there had been no insurrections in Kragujevac and 
Niš5. The Belgrade press fiercely responded to the 
allegations of the Bulgarian newspapers. The 
introductory text of Politika, a Belgrade newspaper, 
revealed the hidden agenda of the Bulgarian 
newspapers which had been writing about the 
“decimation of Macedonian recruits in a garrison 
near Ristovac”6, without having sufficient 
information on the fact that no garrison existed in the 
aforementioned place. 
Apart from political and press intrigues, there 
were direct acts aimed at endangering the security 
situation in the border areas. The Bulgarians made 
maximum efforts to cause riots and compromise the 
Serbian government structures in the newly liberated 
regions. The goal of creating new conflicts in the 
border areas was based on the expectations of the 
authorities in Sofia that the deterioration of the 
general state would lead to a foreign intervention in 
4
 Ristovac is a town in what is today the Pčinja District. After 
the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the demarcation line between 
Serbia and Turkey passed near Ristovac, and the place itself 
contained a border watchtower. After Old Serbia and 
Macedonia had been liberated, this place lost its strategic 
significance and it no longer contained larger military units.  
5
Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–
1914 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia 1903–1914], vol. VII, nb. 1, January 1/14 – 
April 30/May 13, 1914, doc. No. 636, p. 793. 
6
 Politika, May 31, 1914, ed. 3727, 1. 
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Vardar Macedonia
7
 and the reopening the 
Macedonian issue [see: 19; 18]. 
Sofia’s policy of hostility towards the Serbian 
people was not directed only towards Serbia. These 
political principles were directed towards Cetinje, the 
capital of another Serbian state. Bulgaria could not 
forgive Montenegro’s fighting on Serbia’s side in the 
Second Balkan War. This is why there was a cooling 
of diplomatic relations between Sofia and Cetinje, 
which led to the Bulgarian Government deciding to 
close its legation in Montenegro. The decision also 
meant that upon closing the diplomatic mission of 
their country, the Bulgarian people in this country 
would manage their affairs over the Austro-
Hungarian Legation. As a commentary of this issue, 
the daily newspaper Politika published an article 
titled The Bulgarians and Cetinje, which stated the 
following: “The role of the former Bulgarian legation 
in Cetinje was and still is a matter of general 
knowledge. It was the main office of intrigues against 
Serbia and the place where the final brotherly coating 
was given to all the machinations and fabrications 
which were to create an abyss of hatred and distrust 
between Belgrade and Cetinje. Today, when such 
intriguing agitation became impossible, the 
Bulgarians, being practical people, saw it fit to 
liquidate this legation”8. 
The political circumstances in Bulgaria did not 
unfold in favor of the Entente Powers. Large war 
failures, which cost Bulgaria 55 000 people and 
caused devastation to its national economy with 
damages exceeding two billion levs, caused an 
atmosphere of distrust towards the government of 
Stoyan Danev. In July 1913, Danev’s government 
was deposed, which was followed by the forming of 
a coalition government of liberal parties. This was 
the moment when Vasil Radoslavov, the Bulgarian 
liberal, entered the political stage again [15, p. 291]. 
His election for the head of government caused the 
Bulgarian foreign policy to change its pro-Russian 
course and gain clear pro-Germanic characteristics
9
. 
The new orientation of the Bulgarian foreign policy 
could quite certainly be seen as Sofia’s desire to 
revise the borders set by the Treaty of Bucharest. 
Since Serbia maintained friendly relations with the 
7
Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–
1914 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia 1903–1914], vol. VII, nb. 1, January 1/14 – April 
30/May 13, 1914, doc. No. 641, pp. 796–797. 
8
 Politika, April 23, 1914, ed. 3691, 2. 
9 Vreme bezumlja: dokumenti o bugarskim zločinima u 
vranjskom kraju 1915-1918 [A Time of Insanity: The 
Documents on the Bulgarian Crimes in the Region of 
Vranje 1915–1918], ed.: A. Trajković, Belgrade, 1981, 11. 
Entente Powers, the expectations of the Bulgarian 
political leadership were that cooperating with 
Austria-Hungary and Germany would lead to the 
accomplishment of Bulgaria’s expansionist goals 
[3, p. 15]. This was also backed by an open hostility 
of Vienna towards Belgrade and Cetinje [11, p. 187]. 
Even before the Assassination in Sarajevo, 
which served the Dual Monarchy as a pretext for war 
with Serbia, Bulgarian representatives negotiated 
joining the Central Powers. The Austro-Hungarian 
delegate in Sofia, Count Tarnowski, incessantly 
reported to Vienna that the Bulgarian Government 
insisted on creating ties between Bulgaria and the 
Monarchy. These requests by Sofia in late 1913 were 
not only a policy of its new government but also a 
policy of the Bulgarian state and its sovereign, who 
personally advocated creating strong relations with 
Vienna, thus implementing a vindictive plan towards 
Serbia [23, p. 80]. Since Austria-Hungary had 
Romania on its side, and Germany counted on the 
support of Greece, they were not able to completely 
fulfill the plans of the Bulgarians, but kept everything 
in the phase of negotiations with frequent delays. The 
goal of the Germanic policy was to form a new block 
in the Balkans that would contain, apart from 
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Greece, which would 
completely eliminate Russian influence in the 
peninsula. In order to achieve the mentioned goal, 
Vienna and Berlin held Bulgaria on standby and 
waited for a suitable time to activate it [3, p. 19]. 
On St. Vitus Day, June 28, 1914, Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of Austria-
Hungary, was assassinated in Sarajevo [2, p. 172; 6, 
p. 685]. The assassination was performed by a Serb,
Gavrilo Princip, a member of the political-
revolutionary organization Young Bosnia [10, p. 17].
This event served as a pretext to the authorities in
Vienna to declare war on Serbia, who was accused of
initiating secret affairs directed against Austria-
Hungary. It was stated that the ultimate goal of these
affairs was the destruction of the state system of the
Habsburg Monarchy [12, p. 5]. To be more precise,
the reason for the declaration of war was Austria-
Hungary’s tendency to destroy Serbia and establish
complete Germanic dominance in the Balkans.
The Bulgarian government wished for a war 
between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia. After 
St. Vitus Day in 1914, almost every Bulgarian 
newspaper wrote about the alleged direct 
involvement of official Belgrade in the assassination, 
without having any proof that was the case. The 
editorial of the 136
th
 edition of the newspaper 
Narodni Prava, which was considered to be a body 
of the Government of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, 
demanded from all other states “to at long last 
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extinguish the hearth that is the source of sparks of 
eternal fires and that gives birth to ideas of incredible 
hideous offenses, such as the one that led to the death 
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Archduchess 
Hohenberg”10. It is obvious that these were open 
accusations against Serbia and a call for a 
confrontation with it. 
The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum and the 
declaration of hostility towards Serbia
11
 woke the 
revanchist spirit within the Bulgarian political 
leadership. The majority of Bulgarian print media 
justified the “cruelty with which the Dual Monarchy 
made its decisive move”12 towards Serbia. King 
Ferdinand assessed that the ideal conditions were met 
to avenge the Bregalnica defeat and to realize the 
Great Bulgarian territorial aspirations towards the 
territory of Macedonia and parts of southeastern 
Serbia [3, p. 23]. He substantiated his beliefs by 
matching Bulgarian goals with the plans of Berlin 
and Vienna, which meant that after the Germanic 
soldiers would claim their victory against the Serbs, 
larger parts of southeastern Serbia should be handed 
to Sofia [11, pp. 313-315]. 
During the second half of 1914, negotiations 
between Vienna, Berlin and Sofia were going 
towards a positive conclusion. Bulgaria did not give 
up on its maximalist goals of territorial expansion at 
the expense of Greece, Turkey, and Serbia, but was 
aware of the consequences that this policy brought in 
1913. Therefore, during negotiations, Bulgaria 
expressed its readiness for military action exclusively 
against Serbia. This is why it deemed necessary to 
ensure its rear towards Romania and Turkey, for 
which it expected assistance by the Central Powers. 
The demands that Radoslavov, the President of the 
Bulgarian Government, placed before the 
representatives of the Tripartite Pact meant that the 
Central Powers would guarantee the integrity of 
Bulgarian territory from all attacks by any state, and 
to enable Bulgaria’s territorial expansion towards the 
areas that Bulgaria has historic and ethnic rights to. 
These demands included the territory of Serbia that 
10
 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–
1914 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia 1903–1914], vol. VII, nb. 2, May 1/14 – 
July 22/August 4, 1914, editors: V. Dedijer, Ž. Anić, 
Belgrade, 1980, doc. No. 310, pp. 441-442. 
11
Srpsko–austrijski i evropski rat. Diplomatski i drugi 
dokumenti [Serbian-Austrian and European war: 
Diplomatic and Other Documents]. Serbian diplomatic 
correspondence, Niš, 1914, doc. No. 32, pp. 35–40. 
12
 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–
1914 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia 1903–1914], vol. VII, nb. 2, May 1/14 – 
July 22/August 4, 1914, doc. No. 640, pp. 713-714. 
Bulgaria had aspirations to during the period of the 
Russia-Turkey War [3, p. 23-24]. However, 
Bulgaria’s demands caused confusion and concerns 
of Romania and Greece, which had no interest in 
redrawing the borders determined by the peace 
agreement in 1913
13
. 
Because Sofia and Bucharest had undefined 
relations characterized by mistrust, up to the end of 
July Vienna demanded that Bulgaria not openly join 
the Central Powers, although Germany and Austria-
Hungary counted on its support in the final conflict. 
However, as soon as Turkey joined the Central 
Powers, Berlin insisted on concluding an agreement 
with Bulgaria. On August 9, 1914, following 
extensive diplomatic preparation, the German and 
Austro-Hungarian delegates in Sofia and Prime 
Minister Radoslavov agreed upon the texts of 
agreements between Austria and Bulgaria, and 
Germany and Bulgaria. They implied active military 
participation of Bulgaria against Serbia because 
Berlin considered that Bulgaria had to make some 
kind of contribution in order to earn the territorial 
expansion granted to it by the pact with the Central 
Powers. The contract clearly stated that Germany 
would support the territorial expansion of Bulgaria 
by annexing “the provinces to which it has historic 
and ethnic rights, and which are under the rule of 
those Balkan states that are not allies to the German 
Reich”. Despite the fact that the text of the pact was 
accepted by the Bulgarian Government on August 10, 
King Ferdinand did not agree with it. He demanded 
that Germany and Austria-Hungary guarantee 
Bulgaria’s territorial expansion towards the areas that 
were included in the Mürzsteg Reform in 190314, and 
the annexation of areas which Greece received in the 
wars led in 1912/1913 if Greece joined the war on the 
side of the Entente. The third demand of Ferdinand 
was that the agreements needed to clearly specify 
which Balkan states were allies of the Central 
Powers. After these demands, the negotiations for 
signing a pact with Bulgaria were delayed for a 
certain period of time [3, pp. 31–35]. 
The postponement of negotiations was 
additionally encouraged by Serbian success in the 
front line. After the Serbian forces won in the Battle 
13
 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–
1914 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia 1903–1914], vol. VII, nb. 2, May 1/14 – 
July 22/August 4, 1914, doc. No. 678, p. 732. 
14
 The Mürzsteg Reform was planned within the agreement 
between Russia and Austria-Hungary in Mürzsteg on 
February 2, 1903 after the Ilinden Uprising was crushed, 
and it included the Kosovo, Bitola and Thessaloniki 
vilayets. See: [1, p. 326]. 
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of Cer
15
 and the Serbian Army performed a 
successful counter-offensive on the Kolubara River, 
when every last Austro-Hungarian soldier was 
banished from the territory of Serbia, the Bulgarian 
public faced a slight feeling of disenchantment. Pro-
Germanic political circles in Sofia rejoiced and 
celebrated when Belgrade fell but were completely 
stunned by the news of the success of the Serbian 
Army. The best proof of this are the texts of 
Bulgarian newspapers which were analyzed in the 
articles of the daily newspaper Politika, whose text 
titled “In Sofia”, published on December 22, 1914, 
spoke about the shock and disenchantment of the 
Sofia press after Serbian war exploits against 
Austria-Hungary. “The victory of Serbia, which was 
already buried in Sofia, startled even the most 
chauvinist spirits and, all of a sudden, despite all the 
self-delusion, sparked an atmosphere of respect 
towards the neighbour that was underestimated and 
challenged for so long”, stated an article in the 
Politika and emphasized that “Serbia could 
honorably say that it had not wronged Bulgaria, 
either as a neighbor, or as a member of the Slavic 
community, and that it had remained on top of things 
during the hardest challenges and temptations. 
Armed raids, the incessant negative newspaper 
campaign, and fantastic fabrications on the chaos 
within the old and new boundaries of Serbia – all of 
this could not disrupt our tactful behavior towards 
Sofia”16, As we can see, the readiness of the 
Bulgarian Government and the Court to lead Bulgaria 
into war against Serbia, expecting its fast collapse, 
diminished after Austro-Hungarian defeats in August 
and December 1914. King Ferdinand and Radoslavov 
did not abandon their policy towards Serbia, but they 
waited for a suitable moment. Having realized the 
awkward position of the Central Powers in the 
Balkans after the military failures, they constantly 
increased their demands against Vienna and Berlin 
[3, p. 61]. 
Bulgaria brilliantly played the role of a neutral 
neighbor to Serbia throughout 1914, which did not 
even slightly disrupt the activity of its Komitadji 
troops. Armed raids of Bulgarian Komitadji troops in 
the territory of Macedonia were carried out 
continuously since the autumn of 1913. During 1914 
and the conflicts with the Monarchy, the number of 
Bulgarian troops that endangered the border areas in 
southeast Serbia grew continuously. Because of this, 
Čolak-Antić, a representative of the Kingdom of 
Serbia in Sofia, wrote to the Serbian Government in 
15 The Historical Archives of Zaječar, The Varia 
Collection 1789–1990, box No.: 1, doc. No. 24. 
16
 Politika, December 22, 1914, ed. 3891, 1. 
Niš17 that the Bulgarian champions “Genadiyev and 
General Boyadzhiev were secretly encouraging the 
Macedonians to immediately transfer some troops 
into Macedonia and provoke an uprising there”18. His 
report states that many Bulgarian officers got a leave 
of absence and went towards the border between 
Serbia and Bulgaria in order to prepare the troops
19
. 
During 1915, the Komitadji actions grew in 
volume because the troops formed and equipped in 
Bulgaria contained a number of Turkish volunteers 
and Austro-Hungarian officers. In early April 1915, 
there was a fierce assault of the Bulgarian Komitadji 
on the Serbian troops stationed on the border not far 
from Strumica and Valandovo [16, p. 107]. After 
strenuous combat, the Serbian forces managed to 
repel the attack. Based on surveys and examined 
documents found on the dead Komitadji, it was 
concluded that their troops were well organized, 
armed and trained in Bulgaria
20
. Upon the intrusion 
of Bulgarian units to the territory of Serbia at 
Strumica, the authorities in Belgrade sent a note to 
the forces it was allied to in which it sought their 
protection and intervention. Despite all of the 
evidence, the Bulgarian telegraph agency and all 
newspapers from Sofia claimed that none of the 
Bulgarian officers and soldiers crossed the border, 
but that the aforementioned incident was caused by 
local Turkish companies that fought “against Serbian 
physical and administrative violence” in Macedonia 
[20, p. 74]. Similar attacks and the violations of the 
border between Serbia and Bulgaria happened 
incessantly. Apart from the armed and sabotage 
actions, members of the Bulgarian organization 
performed an energetic propaganda campaign among 
the populace of south and southeastern Macedonia. 
The state of war that Serbia was in was also a 
contributing factor. An especially important issue 
was mobilizing conscripts from the newly liberated 
regions, and the members of the Bulgarian 
organization made use of this fact. Motivated by the 
Bulgarian propaganda, a part of the male populace 
from the Štip and Bitola regions left the territory of 
Serbia in order not to be conscripted, and fled into 
Bulgaria, which was neutral at that time. Certain 
Serbian officials suggested that the population of 
17
 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–
1914 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia 1903–1914], vol. VII, nb. 2, May 1/14 – 
July 22/August 4, 1914, doc. No. 580, p. 679.  
18
 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–
1914 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia 1903–1914], vol. VII, nb. 2, May 1/14 – 
July 22/August 4, 1914, doc. No. 678, p. 732.  
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Politika, April 12, 1915, ed. 3997, 1. 
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southern and southeastern Macedonia should not be 
treated in the same way regarding military duty as the 
population of Old Serbia because the contrary could 
lead to large-scale incidents [5, pp. 262-263]. While 
Bulgaria and Turkey systematically infiltrated their 
people and created networks of armed groups for 
actions against the Serbian authorities, fear and 
uncertainty once again became dominant throughout 
the territory of Macedonia [6, p. 721]. 
Parallel to the Bulgarian-backed terrorist actions 
and propaganda campaign in newly liberated areas, 
Sofia was very active in terms of diplomacy. During 
1915, the negotiations on Bulgaria’s joining the 
Central Powers were continued, which was paralleled 
by persistent attempts from the Entente Powers to 
win the favor of the Bulgarian political leadership 
and get Bulgaria to join their side [17, pp. 165-166]. 
The Bulgarian policy in 1915 was defined by open 
trade aiming at grabbing as much territory from other 
countries and creating the largest state in the 
southeast of Europe [9, p. 8]. 
Great Britain and Russia tried to strengthen their 
influence in the Balkans by all means and secure 
Sofia’s military and political support by granting its 
wishes. Therefore, London was ready to grant 
Bulgaria the territory of Macedonia up to the line 
determined by the agreement between Serbia and 
Bulgaria in 1912
21
, while Saint Petersburg played the 
card of a still vivid memory of Russia’s role as 
Bulgaria’s liberator, and the belief of the masses that 
the fate of Bulgaria lay in the hands of Saint 
Petersburg. The diplomatic actions of the Entente 
gained the support of the Bulgarian opposition, and it 
resulted in the Bulgarian Government contemplating 
the possibility of both retaining neutrality and still 
gaining the whole of Macedonia [3, pp. 62-63]. 
However, the news of Entente’s offers alarmed 
Vienna and Berlin. Aware that the creation of a new 
Balkan block against them would be more dangerous 
that any allied success on the eastern or western 
front, they approached the continuing negotiations 
with Sofia with greater flexibility. All available 
political means were used to successfully conclude 
the negotiations, which even included bribing 
Bulgarian politicians. The situation was additionally 
complicated by Italy joining the Entente. Under such 
21
 Archive of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, 
Political department, 1912, F – Annex, D – 
Correspondence with Bulgaria, The Contract of Friendship 
and Alliance between the Kingdom of Serbia and the 
Kingdom of Bulgaria, February 29/March 13, 1912, in: 
Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914 
[Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia 1903–1914], vol. V, nb. 1, January 1/14 – 
July 14/27, 1912, editor: M. Vojvodić, Belgrade, 1984, 
doc. No. 168, pp. 375–378.  
circumstances, the Central Powers intensified 
negotiations with Bulgaria, which were ended on 
September 6, 1915 by signing an alliance agreement 
and a secret convention [14, p. 29]. This agreement 
granted Bulgaria territorial expansion at the expense 
of Serbia. According to Article 1 of the secret 
convention, it received 51, 425 square kilometers and 
2, 648, 168 inhabitants with the following Serbian 
administrative units [3, pp. 169-170]. 
The Entente sent a ceremonial note to Sofia on 
September 1, 1915, but to no avail [22, p. 142]. 
Bulgaria had made its decision. By accepting the 
stated territorial grants given by the Central Powers, 
all the obstacles for a coordinated action of their and 
Bulgarian armed forces against Serbia were removed, 
which heralded a beginning of a new offensive. 
According to clearly stated obligations from the 
agreement and the secret convention signed with 
Germany (September 6, 1915), Bulgarian forces first 
needed to be mobilized, and then concentrated on the 
western border towards Serbia. They were tasked 
with commencing an attack on Serbia towards 
Zaječar, Niš, and further south towards Old Serbia 
after Austro-Hungarian and German units had started 
their attack on the Sava and the Danube. Supreme 
command over all the troops which participated in 
the assault on Serbia was given to the German 
Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen 
[13; 12, p. 208].  
Table 
Area and population of the territories of Serbia 
rejected in favor of Bulgaria 
Aministrative district 
name 
Size in km
2
 
Number of 
inhabitants 
1. Požarevac 4,157 262,603 
2. Krajina 2,909 113,128 
3. Half of the Morava
Administrative District
1,450 103,270 
4. Timok 3,196 150,965 
5. Niš 2,558 201,762 
6. Pirot 2,419 114,115 
7. Vranje 4,342 257,087 
8. Kumanovo 3,500 166,939 
9. Štip 3,500 200,000 
10. Kavadarci 3,500 97,763 
11. Bitola 4,000 345,759 
12. Debar 3,500 82,476 
13. Tetovo 3,500 157,248 
14. Skopje 3,500 153,293 
15. Third of the Priština
Administrative District
1,200 80,000 
16. Toplica 2,839 112,610 
17. Half of the Kruševac
Administrative District
1,355 85,150 
Total: 
around 
51,425 
around 
2,648,168 
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Preparations for war were performed on all 
sides. Even though the northern and western front 
were very significant to Serbia, it paid a lot of 
attention to its border with Bulgaria. After 
mobilization was announced in Bulgaria, Serbia was 
aware of a real danger from a possible attack from 
the east. This is why the Serbian High Command 
grouped the troops in the New Region, and on 
September 30 it started forming the Timok Army and 
the Vlasina Unit. In order to secure the border 
between Serbia and Bulgaria, on September 30, the 
High Command issued an order to the Timok Army 
that stated: “We are on the brink of war with the 
Bulgarians. Bulgaria is in a state of mobilization, 
which was completed on September 28 as far as 
infantry is concerned while the other segments will 
be completed on September 30. The concentration of 
forces is likely to start then. The Timok Army’s task 
is to secure the border front from St. Nicholas to the 
mouth of the Timok River, where it empties into the 
Danube. According to the strict order of our 
government, the troop commanders should abstain 
from anything that could give the Bulgarians a 
motive to present us as instigators of war to our 
allies”22. 
The enemy offensive started on October 6, 1915, 
with the bombing of Belgrade. The Bulgarian troops 
were then still on standby. It was only on October 14 
that they started an attack from the east, and 
practically attacked the Serbian northern defenses 
from the rear. The force of the Bulgarian attack from 
the rear did not affect the Serbian Second Army. 
Under the command of General Stepa Stepanović, the 
Serbian forces managed to repel the first Bulgarian 
attacks. However, the troops in the north were not 
sufficient to stop an enemy superior in numbers. A 
gradual retreat from the northern front line also 
influenced the units of the Serbian Second Army [12, 
p. 210]. This situation forced the High Command of
the Serbian Army to ask the Russian Tzar for help via
its military envoy in Saint Petersburg. This request
stated that “the Serbian Army, significantly weaker
than the Austro-German and Bulgarian forces, will
not be able to resist and stop their onslaught, despite
its readiness to halt the enemy at every turn with
utmost persistence”23. This is why Russia was asked
to take action that would exert any form of pressure
on Bulgaria in order to halt the offensive of its army
22
 Veliki rat Srbije 1914–1918 [The Great War of Serbia 
1914–1918], editors: M. Vojvodić, D. Živojinović, 
Belgrade 1970, doc. No. 100, p. 191. 
23
 Veliki rat Srbije 1914 – 1918 [The Great War of Serbia 
1914–1918], doc. No. 101, pp. 192–193. 
against Serbia
24
. Despite the Serbian appeals for 
assistance, there were no changes in the front towards 
Bulgaria. The Vlasina Unit commanded by 
Lieutenant Colonel Milovan Plazina offered efficient 
resistance to the Bulgarian forces; however, the 
stretch from Vlasina to Kriva Palanka was defended 
by conscripts of the rear guard, mainly from the 
newly liberated regions, who were not particularly 
skilled in warfare. This is how the Bulgarians 
managed to cut the railway line between Niš and 
Thessaloniki near Vranje on October 16, which 
entailed the interruption of the railway connection 
with the allied forces in Greece [7, pp. 34–36]. 
The Bulgarian Second Army fiercely advanced 
on the Macedonian front. The forces of the first call-
up of the Bregalnica Division, incomparably weaker 
than the Second Bulgarian Army, were defeated and 
forced to retreat. As early as October 19, the 
Bulgarians managed to reach the Vardar River, they 
entered Kumanovo on October 20, seized Skopje on 
October 22, and took control of the strategically 
important Kačanik Gorge on October 26. Because of 
poor results, General Petar Bojović replaced General 
Damnjan Popović as the commander of the “New 
Region” troops but was unable to do anything that 
would change the situation in the field due to difficult 
conditions across all battlegrounds. The Second 
Serbian Army was also unable to strike back at the 
enemy, but on November 9, when the front at the 
Pusta River began to crumble under the onslaught of 
the Bulgarians, it managed to consolidate its lines 
and suppress the enemy towards Leskovac. A fact 
that contributed to this success was the arrival of 
Stepa Stepanović, the division commander and future 
army commander, and King Peter to the first combat 
lines, a rare occasion in the history of warfare 
[12, p. 210].  
The successful military campaign of the 
Bulgarian forces in the very south of Serbia was very 
significant to the Central Powers, cutting away Serbia 
from the Aegean Sea. Serbia was then in a difficult 
and nearly hopeless situation. Under the increasing 
onslaught of enemy forces, the Serbian Army and 
refugees flocked to the territory of Kosovo and 
Metohija [8, pp. 20-21]. The retreat of the Serbian 
Army opened the path for Austria-Hungary and 
Bulgaria to occupy Serbia. It was not long before 
Vienna and Sofia managed to establish complete 
control over Serbia and start forming an occupational 
government system. Finally, the conquered territory 
was divided between the Dual Monarchy and 
Bulgaria. Since January 1, 1916, the Austro-
Hungarian part was administratively known as the 
24
 Ibid. 
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General Governorate of Serbia, while Bulgaria 
practically annexed eastern and southern Serbia. It 
divided its spoils of war into two military 
administrative areas – the Morava Area or 
“Pomoraviyata” and the Macedonian Area. The 
center of the Morava Administrative Area, which 
encompassed the entire eastern and southern half of 
the territories that belonged to Serbia up to 1912, was 
in Niš while the center of the Macedonian 
Administrative Area was in Skopje. Six new counties 
of the Bulgarian occupation administration were the 
Niš, Vranje, Pirot, Zaječar, Ćuprija, and Požarevac 
counties. The counties were divided into 
municipalities and the municipalities were divided 
into districts. The supreme government in the 
counties was held by the Bulgarian Army. Upon its 
arrival, Serbian laws were suspended in these 
counties, and all the institutions were in the hands of 
Bulgarian clerks [21, p. 57]. 
The occupied parts of Serbia were not 
considered conquered areas. The Bulgarians treated 
them as liberated areas or Bulgarian “western” 
provinces. Apart from that, Sofia was convinced that 
Serbia as a state was wiped out forever from history 
in 1915 and that the “liberated” areas contained no 
Serbs at all. This is why the Bulgarian high 
Command considered that everything that reminded 
people of Serbia and the Serbs in the occupied areas 
should be eradicated by force and a firm government. 
A pure Bulgarian character needed to be imposed in 
the Morava Administrative Area, and turn it into the 
Morava region of Bulgaria. In order to achieve this, 
the authorities banned the use of the Serbian 
language and led a policy of aggressive assimilation 
[21, p. 57]. 
The relations between Serbia and Bulgaria after 
the Second Balkan War could not be friendly 
anymore. Despite the efforts of official Belgrade to 
establish proper relations with Sofia after diplomatic 
missions were reestablished, the defeat in the Second 
Balkan War and the loss of territories according to 
the decisions of the Bucharest Peace Conference 
disabled the political leadership of the Kingdom of 
Bulgaria to accept that with honesty. Official Sofia 
only simulated neutrality in 1914, while at the same 
time it prepared for a clash with Serbia. Even during 
the first months of the Great War, while Bulgaria was 
emphasizing its military neutrality, its newspapers 
criticized the defensive policy of the Kingdom of 
Serbia and publicized a great number of false claims 
regarding the quality of Serbian administration in the 
newly liberated regions and the way the central 
authorities treated Serbian citizens of Old Serbia and 
Macedonia. Parallel to propaganda activities, the 
Komitadji gangs organized by active Bulgarian 
officers endangered the border between Serbia and 
Bulgaria in the southern regions of the Kingdom of 
Serbia by incessant provocations. This seemingly fair 
relationship between Belgrade and Sofia will be 
definitely ruined by Bulgaria’s accession to the 
Central Powers and its entering the war against 
Serbia. The fall of 1915 brought with it the retreat of 
the Serbian Army towards Kosovo and Metohija and 
Albania and heralded the beginning of great 
tribulations of the Serbian civilian population under 
Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian occupation 
administration. 
This paper was produced within the project 
“Tradition, Modernization and National Identity in 
Serbia and the Balkans in the Process of European 
Integration” (179074), funded by the Ministry of 
Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia. 
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